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TAKINGS OF WILDLIFE UNDER THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AFTER BABBITT 
v. SWEET HOME CHAPTER OF COMMUNITIES 
FOR A GREAT OREGON 
Lawrence R. Liebesman, Esq. t 
Steven G. Davison:j: 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter 
of Communities for a Great Oregon! rejected a facial challenge to the United 
States Fish and Wildlife Service's (FWS) regulation2 which prohibits (under 
the taking provision3 of the Endangered Species Act (the ESA or Act)) signif-
icant modification of wildlife habitat that kills or injures members of species 
protected under the Act. Yet, the decision failed to answer a number of 
questions that may arise where the FWS's regulation is applied to particular 
factual circumstances. Because a majority of the Justices held that habitat 
modification only violates the FWS's regulation when it proximately causes 
death or injury to members of a wildlife species protected under the Act, 
lower courts are now required to resolve various issues involving what 
constitutes "injury" to a protected species. These issues include whether 
injury can occur when habitat modification impairs breeding, feeding, shel-
tering, or other essential behavior of members of a protected wildlife species 
or only when habitat modification causes physical injury to an individual 
animal that is a member of a protected wildlife species. 
State endangered species statutes and regulations are affected by the 
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because section 6(t) of the federal ESA prohibits "any State law or regulation 
respecting the taking of an endangered or threatened species . . . [from 
being] less restrictive than prohibitions"4 in any regulation which implements 
the Act. State statutes and regulations prohibiting the taking of a species of 
wildlife protected under the FWS's taking regulation must be at least as 
restrictive as the FWS's regulation. However, a taking prohibition under a 
state endangered species statute or regulation need not be interpreted the 
same way as the FWS's regulation is interpreted by a lower federal court or 
a court of another state. 
This article will analyze the Supreme Court's Sweet Home Chapter 
.decision and discuss how the FWS's regulation, held facially valid in that 
decision, should be interpreted. 5 This article will also discuss how taking 
prohibitions in state endangered species statutes and regulations should be 
interpreted under this decision. 
II. HABITAT PROTECTION AND THE ESA 
The ESA seeks to prevent endangered species6 and threatened species? of 
fish and wildlife from becoming extinct, and to increase populations of 
endangered and threatened species to levels that make it unnecessary to list 
and protect them under the Act. Protection of the habitats of endangered and 
threatened species of fish and wildlife from destruction or signiticant 
detrimental alteration is one method used by the federal government to 
achieve these goals. These habitats are protected under the Act because "the 
survival of individual wild animals, as well as species of wildlife, is 
dependent upon habitat, which provides wildlife with food, shelter, protec-
tion (from human and animal predators), breeding sites, and sites for rearing 






16 U.S.C. § 1535(0 (1994). 
For a discussion of the history of the FWS's takings regulation and of the District 
Court's and Court of Appeals' decisions in the Sweet Home Chapter litigation. see 
Steven Davison, AlteratIOn of Wildlife Habitat as a Prohibited Taking Under the 
Endangered Species Act, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 155 (1995). 
An endangered species is defined under the ESA as "any species ... in danger of 
extinction thrOUghOut all or a significant portion of its range" other than certain 
insect pests. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6) (1994). 
A threatened species is defined under the ESA as "any species which is likely to be-
come an endan~ered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a signili-
cant portion of its range." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(20). 
Davison. supra note 5, at 156. 
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One method used by Congress under the Act to protect endangered 
species is to make it illegal, unless a permit has been obtained, for any 
person9 to "take" any endangered species of fish or wildlife within the 
United States. 1O Although the phrase to "take any such species" under 
section 10 of the Act might be interpreted to mean that a prohibited taking 
can occur only when all members of a species are takenll or only when at 
least several members of a species are taken,I2 section 9 has been interpreted 
by the courts as prohibiting "any taking and every taking-even of a single 
9. "Person" is defined under the ESA to mean: 
an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any other 
private entity; or any officer, employee, agent, department or instrumen-
tality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or political 
subdivision of a State, or of any foreign government; any State, municipal-
ity, or political subdivision of a State; or any other entity subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States. . . 
16 U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1994). 
10. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B). Section 9(a)(1)(B) of the ESA provides: 
11. 
12. 
Except as provided in sections 1535(g)(2) and 1539 of this title, with 
respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant to 
section 1533 of this title, it is unlawful for any person subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States to-
(B) take any such species within the United States or the territorial sea 
of the United States. 
ld. The habitat of a species protected under the ESA can be preserved through the 
acquisition of wildlife habitat by the federal government under section 5, 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1534 (1994) and through a dIrective to federal agencies under section 7(a)(2), id. 
§ 1536(a)(2), not to authorize, fund or carry out any action likely to result in the 
destruction or adverse modification of any habitat of a threatened or endangered 
species that has been designated as critical by the federal government. See Davison, 
supra note 5, at 175-78. 
See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, - U.S. 
-, 115 S. Ct. 2407, 2413 n.10 (1995) ("the statutory text ... forbids not taking 
'some creature' but 'tak[ing] any [endangered] species - a formidable task for even 
the most rapacious feudal lord. "). 
The Supreme Court's reference to the FWS's definition of "harm" encompassing 
"habitat modification that results in actual injury or death to members of an 
endangered or threatened species," id. at 2412-14 (emphasis added), has been the 
basis for an argument that the Supreme Court "only upheld the legality of the 
'harm' regulation when a land use activity would cause the demise of several 
members of a listed wildlife species" and "that the loss of one individual or a few 
individuals in a growing or stable population, which thereby retards recovery, is not 
'harm. '" Steven P. Quarles et al., Sweet Home and the Narrowing of Wildlife 
"Take" Under Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 10003, 
10009-10 (Envtl. L. Inst. 1996). 
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individual of the protected species. "13 This taking prohibition, as drafted, 
applies throughout the United States and is applicable to takings of endan-
gered species that occur on privately owned land, as well as to takings that 
occur on public lands owned by federal, state, or local governments. 
Furthermore, the FWS has promulgated a regulation14 which the courts have 
upheld1s that makes it illegal to "take" a threatened species of fish or wild-
life. 
A person who commits a prohibited taking of even one animal that is 
listed as endangered or threatened species is subject under the ESA to federal 
civill6 and criminal penalties17 (fines or imprisonment, or both). In addition, 
ongoing conduct by a person that constitutes a prohibited taking in violation 
of the Act is subject to an injunction. An injunction is issued by a federal 
district court in a suit brought by either the United States Attorney General18 
or by private citizens or organizations who have standing to sue under the 
citizen suit provisionl9 of the ESA.20 
The ESA defines "take" to mean "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, 
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such 
conduct. "21 Exercising authority under the ESA to "promulgate such 
regulations as may be appropriate to enforce" the Act,22 the FWS in 1981 
adopted a regulation to protect endangered and threatened species from being 
killed or injured by alteration of their habitat. This regulation defines 











Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Vol usia County, 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1180 
(M.D. Fla. 1995) (emphasis added). See Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for 
a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1993), modified on other 
grounds, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994), 
rev'd, - U.S. -, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995) (stating that habitat modification 
constitutes "harm" when it "causes ascertainable physical injury or death to an 
individual member of a listed species. "). 
50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (1993). 
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d 1 
(D.C. Cir. 1993), modified on other grounds, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir.). reh'g 
denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994). rev'd on other grounds. - U.S. -,115 S. 
Ct. 2407 (1995). 
16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(1) (1994). 
[d. § 1540(b)(1). 
16 U.S.C. § 1540(e)(6). 
[d. § 1540(g)(1)(A). 
The ESA's enforcement provisions are discussed in Davison, supra note 5, at 170-
75. See also Quarles et aI., supra note 12. at 10008-09, 10012-14. 
16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994). 
[d. § 1540(t). 
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an act which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such act may include 
signiiicant habitat modiiication or degradation where it actually kills 
or injures wildlife [that is an endangered or threatened species] by 
significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including 
breeding, feeding, or sheltering.23 
This regulation has been strongly opposed by the timber industry and land 
developers because it may prohibit the cutting of timber or other de-
velopment of private or public land. However, it is the only mechanism 
available under the ESA to regulate the alteration of wildlife habitat when 
timber cutting or other development is undertaken on private lands by private 
persons not acting pursuant to a federal permit. license, or grant.24 Because 
over sixty percent of the habitat of 247 animal species listed as endangered 
or threatened under the Act are located on non-federallands,25 this regulation 
is an important part of the federal government's program to protect and 
restore endangered and threatened species under the ESA. 
The prohibitions under the ESA and the FWS's regulations are not 
absolute and inflexible. The FWS is authorized to issue permits in certain 
circumstances allowing the taking of an endangered or threatened species that 
otherwise would be prohibited under the ESA. The incidental taking 
23. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1995). 
24. See Davison, supra note 5, at 175-78. Section 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), of 
the ESA only protects wildlife habitat from actions authorized. funded, or carried 
out by a federal administrative agency and only when the habitat modification may 
either cause a protected species to become extinct or will destroy or adversely modI-
fy habitat desIgnated as critical by the federal government. ld. 
However, under the taking prohibition of section 9 of the ESA, "it is irrelevant 
... whether the 'taking' at issue involves a critical habitat or not." Loggerhead 
Turtle v. County Council of Vol usia County, 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1180 (M.D. Fla. 
1995). Section 9 can also be violated even if a protected species will not be 
threatened with extinction as a result of the taking. See Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of 
Land & Natural Resources (palila II), 649 F. Supp. 1070, 1077 (D. Haw. 1986), 
aff'd., 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the population of an endangered 
sI'ecies does not have to "dip, closer to extinction before the [takings] prohibItions 
of section 9 come into force '). In addition, section 9 applies to actions of private 
persons that are not authorized. funded, or carried out by a federal administrative 
agency, thus reaching private conduct not subject to regulation under section 7. See 
SIerra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1512 (9th Cir. 1995) ("when a wholly private 
action threatens imminent harm to a listed species the appropriate safeguard is 
through § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538, and not § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536."). 
Furthermore, although the FWS has adop-ted a regulation, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3, that 
defines "harass" for purposes of the Act s taking prohibition, the FWS did not 
intend for its definition of harass to regulate habitat modification (because its defini-
tion of harm does so). See 40 Fed. Reg. 44,413 (Sept. 26, 1975). See also 
Davison. supra note 5, at 180. 
25. NATIONAL REsEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND TIlE ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr 61 
(1995). 
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provision in section 10 of the Act26 is frequently invoked to allow a person 
to modify wildlife habitat when that action otherwise would be prohibited 
under the ESA as a taking. This provision authorizes the FWS to issue 
permits allowing a taking of endangered species of fish or wildlife provided 
such a taking is incidental to an otherwise lawful activity and is not for the 
purpose of taking a protected species. 27 Such incidental taking permits can 
be issued by the FWS upon a tinding that: 1) the taking will not appreciably 
reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild; 
and 2) the permittee implements a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) to 
minimize and mitigate, to the maximum extent practicable, the impacts of the 
permitted incidental taking. At .present, however, a landowner faces consid-
erable delay and expense in seeking an incidental taking permit that would 
allow the owner to develop his or her land in a way that would modify the 
habitat of an endangered or threatened species of fish or wildlife to an extent 
that a prohibited taking of that species would OCCUr.28 
III. SWEET HOME CHAPTER LITIGATION 
In Sweet Home Chapter, a coalition representing the timber industry chal-
lenged the validity of the FWS's harm regulation, to the extent it prohibited 
habitat modifications as a taking under section 9. The plaintiffs represented 
interests in property inhabited by the threatened northern spotted owl and the 
endangered red-cockaded woodpecker. The timber industry sued, contending 
thilt the harm regulation interfered with their livelihood because moditication 
of the owl or woodpecker's habitat by logging activities would expose them 




16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (1994). 
The FWS has extended this incidental taking permit provision to threatened species 
of fish and wildlife. 50 C.P.R. § 17.32(b) (1995). 
In March 1995, the Secretary of Interior, Bruce Babbitt, announced a policy that 
allows landowners to incidentally take threatened species (but not endangered 
species) of wildlife protected under the ESA when doing certain development 
activities on their land. Such activities, either individually or cumulatively, have 
lasting effects on the likelihood of the species' survival and recovery. This policy 
authorized: (1) development activities on a parcel of land occupied by a single 
household and used only for residential purposes; (2) one-time development 
activities that affect five acres of land or less of contiguous property, provided that 
the property was acquired before the date on which the species occupymg the parcel 
was listed as endangered or threatened; and (3) development activitIes identified by 
FWS as having negligible effects on the survIval of the threatened species. Beth S. 
Ginsberg, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon: A 
Clarion Call for Property Rights Advocates, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 10478, 10484 
(Envtl. L. Inst. 1995). 
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In 1994, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 
by a 2-1 vote, held that this regulation (that defines "harm" and "take" to 
include habitat moditication) was invalid.29 The court held that the regula-
tion was neither clearly authorized by Congress nor a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the ESA. In the opinion, Judges Stephen Williams and David 
Sentelle invalidated the FWS' s definition of harm on the grounds that a 
prohibited taking under the ESA can only occur by a perpetrator's direct 
application of force against the animal taken. The FWS' s inclusion of habitat 
moditication within its definition of harm facially invalidated the definition 
because habitat modification never involves the direct application of force 
against an animal. 
On January 6, 1995, the United States Supreme Court granted the federal 
government's petition for certiorari30 to decide whether the FWS' s regulation 
defining harm to include "significant habitat modification ... that actually 
kills or injures wildlife" is facially invalid, i.e., whether the regulation is 
invalid in every circumstance involving modification of wildlife habitat. 31 On 
June 29, 1995, Justice Stevens delivered the opinion for a majority of six 
Justices with three Justices (Scalia, Rehnquist and Thomas) dissenting. 32 In 





Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 17 F.3d 1463 
(D.C. Cir. 1994), reh 'g denied, 30 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd, - U.S. -, 
115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995). 
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 17 F.3d 1463 
(D.C. Cir. 1994), em. granted, - U.S. -, 115 S. Ct. 714 (Jan. 6, 1995) (No. 94-
859). 
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, - U.S. -, 
115 S. Ct. 2407, 2414 (1995). 
The Supreme Court, however, did not address the issue of whether the FWS's 
definition was facially void for vagueness. [d. at 2410 n.3. The court of appeals 
rejected this facial challenge to the FWS's definition of harm. Sweet Home Chapter 
of Communites for a Great Oregon v. Babbitt, 1 F.3d I, 3-5 (D.C. Cir. 1993), 
modified on other grounds, 17 F.3d 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1994), reh'g denied, 30 F.3d 
190 (D.C. Cir. 1994), rev'd, - U.S. -, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995). See Davison. 
supra note 5, at 208-11. . 
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, - U.S. -, 
115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995). 
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reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous provision of the ESN3 under 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.34 The 
Court agreed with the FWS that a developer could "take" a species by 
modifying habitat and concluded that the FWS's interpretation of harm to 
include habitat modification was reasonable for five reasons. First, it ruled 
that the ordinary dictionary definition of the word harm supported the FWS' s 
construction. 35 Justice Stevens found that "harm" meant "to injure, "36 and 
stated that this definition "naturally encompasses habitat modification that 
results in injury or death to members of an endangered or threatened 
species. "37 The maj ority reasoned that the dictionary definition of harm does 
not limit the word to direct application of force against protected species 
because "the dictionary definition does not include the word 'directly' or 
suggest in any way that only direct or willful action that leads to injury 







Moreover, unless the statutory term "harm" encompasses indirect as 
well as direct injuries. the word has no meaning that does not 
duplicate the meaning of other words that [section] 3 uses to define 
115 S. Ct. at 2416. The majority rejected respondent's argument that "the rule of 
lenity should foreclose any deference to the Secretary's interpretation of the ESA 
because the statute includes criminal penalties." [d. at 2416 n.18. 
Davison, supra note 5, at 205-38, which was published before the SUl?reme 
Court's decision in Sweet Home Chapter, concluded that the FWS's definitIOn of 
harm under the ESA should be upheld under Chevron as a reasonable interpretation 
of ambiguous provisions of the ESA, based on slightly different reasoning than that 
subsequently used by the Supreme Court. Because that article analyzes in depth the 
issues of whether the ESA is clear or ambiguous with respect to whether "take" and 
"harm" under the ESA can include habitat modification, and whether the FWS's 
definition of harm is reasonable in light of the ESA's purposes, provisions and 
legislative history, this article will not analyze those issues. 
Por arguments that the ESA clearly makes the FWS detinition of harm invalid 
and that the FWS definition of harm is invalid under Chevron as an unreasonable 
interpretation of the ESA, see Brief of Amici Curiae Nationwide Public Projects 
Coahtion (CO), Brazos River Authority (fX), Granite Construction Co. (CA), 
Helix Water District (CA). Rancho California Water District (CA), Semitropics 
Water District (CA), West San Bernadino County Water District (CA), Metropoli-
tan Denver Water Authority (CO), Drake Homes, Inc. (CA), Metropolitan Water 
Providers (CO), Wheeler-Ridge Maricopa Water Storage District (CA), the City of 
Safford (AZ), The Villages of Ocean Beach and Saltaire (Ny), and The Fire Island 
AssociatIOn (NY) tiled ill Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a 
Great Oregon, - U.S.-, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995). 
467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
115 S. Ct. at 2412-13. 
[d. at 2412 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICfIONARY 1034 
(1966». 
115 S. Ct. at 2412-13. 
[d. at 2413 (footnote omitted). 
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duplicate the meaning of other words that [section] 3 uses to define 
"take." A reluctance to treat statutory terms as surplusage supports 
the reasonableness of the Secretary's interpretation. 39 
Second, the Court held that the "harm" regulation naturally tits within 
the ESA' s broad purposes to protect habitat and ecosystems of endangered 
and threatened species.40 Third, Justice Stevens was persuaded that the 1982 
enactment of the ESA's incidental taking provision41 reflected Congress' 
understanding that section 9 prohibits "indirect as wei I as deliberate takings" 
and "that activities not intended to harm an endangered species, such as habi-
tat modification," could rise to the level of a "take. "42 Fourth, Justice 
Stevens found support for the FWS's interpretation of harm in three specific 
sections of the ESA: the definition of "take; "43 section 544 (which expressly 
authorizes the federal government to acquire land to protect wildlife habitat); 
and section 745 (which regulates activities of federal agencies).46 Fifth, 
Justice Stevens found sufficient evidence in the ESA's legislative history to 








[d. (citation omitted). 
[d. at 2413-14. 
16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B)(1994). See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. 
115 S. Ct. at 2414. 
16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994). 
[d. § 1534. 
[d. § 1536. The pertinent substantive. provision of section 7 is found in section 
7(a)(2), id. § 1536(a)(2), which provides in pertinent part: 
Each federal agency shall ... insure that any action authorized, funded, or car-
ried out by such agency ... is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence 
of any endangered spec~es or threatened species or result iIi the destruction or 
adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by the Sec-
retary . . . to be critical. 
"Critical habitat" is defmed as habitat that is "essential to the conservation of 
the species," id. § 1532(5)(A)(i), (ii), with conservation defined as "to use and the 
use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered 
species or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant 
to this chapter are no longer necessary." [d. § 1532(3). 
46. 115 S. Ct. at 2414-16. 
47. [d. at 2416-18. Justice Stevens held that the ESA's legislative history "make[s] 
clear that Congress intended 'take' to apply broadly to cover indirect as well as 
purposeful actions," and "support the Secretary's interpretation that the term 'take' 
m section 9 reached far more than the deliberate actions of hunters and trappers." 
[d. at 2416. For a discussion of the legislative history of the ESA discussed by 
Justice Stevens (and Justice Scalia) in Sweet Home Chapter. see Davison. supra note 
5, at 205, 212-14, 232-33. 
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In explaining the Court's fourth reason for sustaining the FWS's 
definition of harm, Justice Stevens found that the court of appeals made three 
errors in determining that harm "must refer to a direct application of force 
because the words around it do. "48 Justice Stevens asserted that the court of 
appeals' first error was its flawed premise that the other words used in the 
ESA's definition of take involved a direct application of force. He pointed 
out that several of the words used in the ESA to detine harm ("especially 
'harass,' 'pursue,' 'wound,' and 'kill''') do not require direct application of 
force. 49 Justice Stevens also concluded that the court of appeals erred in 
tinding that a "take" requires intent or purpose, stating that a "knowing" 
action is enough to violate the Act. 50 Finally, Justice Stevens found that the 
court of appeals erroneously applied the doctrine of noscitur a sociis (" a 
word is known by the company it keeps. ").51 He stated that the lower court 
applied the doctrine contrary to Congress' intent to give "harm" an 
independent meaning "distinct from the functions of the other-verbs used to 
define 'take.' "52 
Justice Stevens, as part of his fourth reason for upholding the FWS's 
definition of harm, also rejected the respondent's argument that Congress 
intended section 5 of the ESA to be the exclusive means to prevent harmful 
habitat moditication on private lands. Section 5 can provide "for protection 
of habitat before the seller's activity has harmed any eildangered animal, 
whereas the Government cannot enforce the [section] 9 prohibition until an 
animal has actually been killed or injured. "53 He added that "the Secretary 







115 S. Ct. at 2414 (footnote omitted). 
Id. at 2414-15. 
Id. at 2415. Justice Stevens apparently was referring to the ESA's provisions for 
civil and criminal penalties for persons who "knowingly violate" the Act, 16 U .S.C. 
§ 1540(a)(1), (b)(I), to which he had referred earlier m his opinion. 115 S. Ct. at 
2412 n.9, 2414 n.l3. 
Id. at 2411. 
Id. at 2415. 
115 S. Ct. at 2415. 
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modification of land that [has] not yet, but may in the future, become habitat 
for an endangered or threatened species. "54 
Justice Stevens also stated several reasons why section 7 of the ESA 
should not alter the Court's holding: 
The [section] 7 directive applies only to the Federal Government, 
whereas the [section] 9 prohibition applies to "any person. " Section 7 
imposes a broad, affirmative duty to avoid adverse habitat modifica-
tions that [section] 9 does not replicate, and [section] 7 does not limit 
its admonition to habitat modification that "actually kills or injures 
wildlife." Conversely, [section] 7 contains limitations that [section] 
9 does not, applying only to actions "likely to jeopardize the 
continued existence of any endangered or threatened species," . . . 
and to modifications of habitat that has been designated "critical" 
pursuant to [section] 4 .... Any overlap that [section] 5 or [section] 
7 may have with [section] 9 in particular cases is unexceptional, .. 
. and simply reflects the broad purpose of the Act set out in [section] 
2 .... 55 
His remark about section 9's overlap with sections 5 and 7 implicitly refuted 
Justice Scalia's dissent that "Congress' explicit prohibition of habitat 
modification in . . . section [7] would bar the inference of an implicit 
prohibition of habitat modification in ... section [9]. "56 In addition, Justice 
Stevens' remark also refutes Justice Scalia's observation that section 9 should 
not apply to habitat modification because a violation of section 7(a)(2)'s pro-
hibition against destruction or adverse modification of designated critical 
habitat always will constitute a prohibited taking under section 9.57 
54. [d. Justice Stevens also concluded that statements by Representative Sullivan, the 
House floor manager, about the endangered species bills enacted as the ESA do not 
"even [suggest] that [section] 5 would be the Act's exclusive remedy for habitat 
modification by private landowners or that habitat modification by private 
landowners stood outside the ambit of [section] 9. Respondent's suggestion that 
these statements identitied [section] 5 as the ESA's only response to habitat 
modification contradicts their emphasis elsewhere on the habitat protections in 
[section] 7." [d. at 2417 n.19. 
55. [d. at 2415-16 (footnote omitted). 
56. [d. at 2425 (Scalia. J., dissenting). 
57. Specifically, Justice Scalia argued: "As 'critical habitat' is habitat 'essential to the 
conservation of the species,' adverse modification of 'critical' habitat by a federal 
agency would also constitute habitat modification that injures a population of wild-
life [in violation of section 9's taking prohibition]." Id. at 2426. See infra notes 
70-74 and accompanying text. 
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Justice Stevens concluded: 
[w]hen it enacted the ESA, Congress delegated broad administrative 
and interpretive power to the Secretary . . . . The proper interpreta-
tion of a term such as "harm" involves a complex policy choice. 
When Congress has entrusted the Secretary with broad discretion, we 
are especi,.lly reluctant to substitute our views of wise policy for his 
. . . . In this caSe, that reluctance accords with our conclusion, based 
on the text, structure, and legislative history of the ESA, that the 
Secretary reasonably construed the intent of Congress when he 
defined "harm" to include "significant habitat moditication or 
degradation that actually kills or injures wildlife. "58 
Justice O'Connor concurred on the basis of two understandings. First, 
"the challenged regulation is limited to signiticant habitat moditication that 
causes actual, as opposed to hypothetical or speculative, death or injury to 
identitiable protected animals. "59 Second, "even setting aside difficult 
questions of scienter, the regulation's application is limited by ordinary 
58. 115 S. Ct. at 2418. Justice Stevens also stated, in the fmal paragraph of his opinion, 
that: 
In the elaboration and enforcement of the ESA, the Secretary and 
all persons who must comply with the law will confront difficult 
questions of proximity and degree; for, as all recognize, the Act 
encompasses a vast ran~e of economic and social enterprises and 
endeavors. These questlOns must be addressed in the usual course 
of the law, through case-by-case resolution and adjudication. 
ld. See Loggerhead Turtle v. Volusia County Council, 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1179 
(M.D. Fla. 1995) (holding that the Court's reference in this passage to "economic 
and social enterprises" did not authorize a court to balance and consider economic 
and social interests and consequences in deciding a motion for a preliminary 
injunction in a suit alleging a prohibited taking in violation of section 9 of the Act). 
59. 115 S. Ct. at 2418 (O'Connor, 1., concurring). 
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principles of proximate causation, which introduces notions of foreseeabili-
ty. "60 
Justice Scalia argued that the definition of "take" under section 9 of the 
ESA should encompass only "affirmative conduct intentionally directed 
against a particular animal or animals. "61 He argued that the FWS's 
detinition of harm violated the ESA and was invalid under the Chevron 
doctrine because of three features: 1) it prohibits habitat modification that 
is merely the cause-in-fact of death or injury to wildlife, without regard to 
intent or foreseeability, "no matter how long the chain of causality between 
modification and injury; "62 2) it applies to omissions as well as to acts;63 and 
3) "it encompasses injury intlicted, not only upon individual animals, but 
upon populations of the protected species."64 Justice Scalia contended that 
"take" under the ESA "describes a class of acts (not omissions) done directly 
and intentionally (not indirectly and by accident) to particular animals (not 
populations of animals). "65 
Justice Scalia also argued that the FWS's detinition of harm provided a 
detinition of "take" under section 9 inconsistent with the meaning of "take" 
used in other sections of the ESA. 66 However, he did not consider the possi-
bility that these other sections of the ESA may use "take" in a narrower 
sense than section 9 does because these other sections are intended to address 
problems presented only by specific types of takings. For example, the 
Native American subsistence exemption may address only deliberate, inten-
60. [d. Justice O'Connor's analysis of these two understandings are analyzed at infra 
notes 105-106, 110-20, 143-44, 150-52, 154-59, and accompanying text. 
Justice O'Connor believed that these two understandings (or "limitations") call 
into question Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources (palila II), 852 
F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988) (see Davison, supra note 5, at 198-205). 115 S. Ct. at 
2418 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Her reasoning in support of these contentions is 
discussed at infra notes 154-60 and accompanying text. Despite these concerns, she 
concurred with the majority "because there IS no need to strike a regulation on a 
facial challenge out of concern that it is susceptible of erroneous application, . . . 
and because there are many habitat-related circumstances in which the regulation 
might validly apply." 115 S. Ct. at 2418. 
61. [d. at 2424 (Scalia, J .. dissenting). 
62. [d. at 2421. 
63. 115 S. Ct. at 2422. 
64. [d. 
65. [d. at 2423. 
66. 115 S. Ct. at 2425. The other sections of the ESA to which Justice Scalia referred 
in this argument were the forfeiture provision in 16 U.S.C. § 1540(e)(4)(B); the 
Native American subsistence exemption in 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e)(1)(A); and the 
prohibition in 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(D) of the possession, sale and transport of 
species taken in violation of the ESA. 
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tional takings of protected species by Alaskan Indians and Eskimos for 
subsistence purposes because Congress decided that only those persons' 
cultural traditions and circumstances justified deliberate takings of protected 
species for subsistence purposes.67 Justice Scalia also asserted that habitat 
modification should not be considered a taking under section 9 of the ESA 
because the forfeiture provision68 does not explicitly provide for forfeiture 
of "plows, bulldozers, and backhoes" that modify wildlife habitat. 69 Howev-
er, he did not consider the possibility that "plows, bulldozers, and backhoes" 
may be encompassed within section 11(e)(4)(B)'s phrase "other equipment 
... used to aid in the taking" of protected species. This phrase might be 
interpreted, however, to limit forfeiture of equipment to that used for the 
purpose of deliberately taking protected species, thus excluding earthmoving 
equipment that did not modify wildlife habitat for the purpose of deliberately 
killing or injuring protected wildlife. 
Justice Scalia also argued that section 9's taking prohibition should not 
apply to habitat modification because such an interpretation makes section 9 
duplicative of section 7's critical habitat provision.70 He asserted that: 
Congress' explicit prohibition of habitat modification in ... section 
[7] would bar the inference of an implicit prohibition of habitat modi-
tication in . . . section [9] . . .. [I]t would be passing strange for 
Congress carefully to define 'critical habitat' as used in § lS36(a)(2), 
but leave it to the Secretary to evaluate, willy-nilly, impermissible 
'habitat modification' (under the guise of 'harm') in § lS38(a)(1)(B).71 
However, Justice Scalia failed to note that the FWS's detinition of harm 
under section 9 does provide a standard for determining when habitat 
modification will be found to be a taking in violation of section 9. Justice 
Scalia also failed to consider that section 7 only applies to actions undertaken 
by federal agencies, or to private actions that use federal funds or have a 
federal permit or license-whereas section 9 can apply to private conduct not 
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(e)(1)(A) (1994). 
68. [d. § 1540(e)(4)(B). 
69. 115 S. Ct. at 2425 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
70. [d. at 2425-26. See supra notes 56-57 and accompan)'ing text. Section 7(a)(2)'s 
critical habitat provision, and section 3 's definition of "critical habitat," are set 
forth in supra note 45. 
71. 115 S. Ct. at 2425-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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involving federal funds, permits or Iicenses.72 The FWS's detinition of harm 
under section 9 of the ESA therefore is significant because it is the only 
regulation under the ESA restricting development of private property which 
modities the habitat of protected species of wildlife when no federal permit, 
license, or funding is involved in the development. Furthermore, Justice 
Scalia did not consider that section 7 only applies when an entire species is 
threatened with extinction or when the habitat of a species that would be 
altered or destroyed has been specifically designated as "critical" by the 
Secretary of Interior.73 In addition, critical habitat has been designated for 
only eighty-three of the 781 species listed under the ESA as endangered or 
threatened. Justice Scalia also failed to note that even if both sections 7(a)(2) 
and 9 of the ESA may, in certain factual circumstances, prohibit the 
moditication of wildlife habitat, Congress is permitted to regulate (and even 
criminally punish) particular conduct under two different sections of a 
statute.74 
Justice Scalia also argues that "the problem of habitat destruction on 
private lands was to be solved principally by the land acquisition program of 
[section] 1534," and that statements by the Senate and House floor managers 
of the endangered species bills enacted as the ESA indicated that "habitat 
modification and takings ... were viewed as different problems, addressed 
by different provisions of the Act. .. 75 However, as noted in the majority 
opinion, there is no language in section 5 of the ESA or in the ESA's 
legislative history that indicates that Congress intended land acquisitions 
under section 5 to be the exclusive means of protecting wildlife habitat on 
private lands.76 In fact, as also noted by the majority, moditication of 
wildlife habitat can be regulated under section 7 ofthe ESA (as well as under 
section 9).77 
Justice Scalia concluded that contrary to the majority's view, the FWS's 







See Davison, supra note 5, at 176. However, a government agency or department 
may commit a taking in violation of section 9 (as well as violate section 7) when it 
issues a permit or license, or grants funds, to another person, when that person's 
governmentally-permitted or funded activity causes a prohibited taking in violation 
of section 9. See id. at 186-87; but see Quarles et al.. supra note 12, at 10013. 
See Davison, supra note 5, at 176-78. 
See id. at 223-24. 
115 S. Ct. at 2427 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Id. at 2415. 
Id. 
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ESN8 or by Congress' enactment in 1982 of the ESA's incidental taking pro-
vision. 79 By stating in his analysis of the ESA's legislative history that "the 
enacted text is ... clear,"SO Justice Scalia appears to imply that the ESA is 
clear and unambiguous as to the Act's definition of "take." If such was the 
case, the Chevron doctrine would direct a court to decide the case de novo 
and not defer to the administrative agency's interpretation of the statute. 81 
Consequently, Justice Scalia's dissent might be interpreted as deciding de 
novo that the ESA clearly and unambiguously invalidates the FWS's 
definition of harm under section 9 to include habitat modification,82 or that 
the FWS' s definition of harm is invalid under the Chevron doctrine as an un-
reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statute. 83 
IV. INTERPRETATION OF "TAKE," "HARM," AND "INJURE" 
AFTER SWEET HOME CHAPTER 
Although a six-Justice majority upheld the FWS's definition of "harm," 
a majority of the Justices did not resolve several other issues that can arise 
in determining if a particular moditication of wildlife habitat constitutes a 
prohibited taking. 
A. Mens Rea Element 
Neither the ESA's detinition of take nor the FWS's definition of harm 
explicitly includes a mental state or mens rea element, but it has been argued 
that a mental state element should be imputed into the definition of "take" 
and "harm." The majority held that the court of appeals erred in reading "a 
requirement of intent or purpose into the words used to detine 'take,' 
78. 115 S. Ct. at 2426-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
79. [d. at 2428-29. 
80. [d. at 2427. 
81. See Davison, supra note 5, at 202-03, 229-30. 
82. However, Davison, supra note 5, at 234-35, argues that the ESA is ambiguous as 
to whether the ESA's taking prohibition encompasses habitat modification. 
83. Near the beginning of his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia stated that "in my view 
petitioners must lose-the regulation must fall-e,,:en under the test of Chevron. 
U.S.A .. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense CouncIl, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843. so 
I shall assume that the Court is correct to apply Chevron. See ante, at 2415-2416, 
and n. 18." 115 S. Ct. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He did not specifically 
identify which test under Chevron he was referencing, but the parts of the majority 
opinion he cited referred to the Chevron doctrine of Judicial deference to a reason-
able administrative agency interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions. ld. 
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[because] it ignored [section] 9's express provision that a 'knowing' action 
is enough to violate the ACt."84 However, section 9(a)(1)(B)'s taking 
provision85 does not explicitly require a "take" to be knowing in order to be 
unlawful in violation of section 9. The majority probably meant to refer to 
the "knowingly violate" language in the civil and criminal penalty provisions 
of section 11 86 of the ESA, to which the Court had referred earlier. 87 The 
majority, however, did not define a "knowing" action, other than to note that 
"Congress added 'knowingly' in place of 'willfully' in 1978 to 'make 
criminal violations of the act a general rather than a specitic intent crime. '''88 
Prior to the Court's decision. lower federal courts defined "knowingly," for 
purposes of the ESA's criminal penalties,89 as a "general intent," requiring 
only that a person's action has been voluntary and intentional and not due to 
accident or mistake. 90 These courts held that a "knowing" violation of the 
ESA's taking prohibitions does not require knowledge by the violator of the 
particular species or subspecies of the animal taken, that the species taken 
was listed under the ESA as endangered or threatened, or that the ESA 
applied to the lands where the taking occurred.91 
By stating that a "knowing" action is sufficient to violate the ESA, the 
majority rejected Justice Scalia's dissent that a "take" must involve "affir-
mative conduct intentionally directed against a particular animal or ani-
mals. "92 Justice Scalia, although requiring a prohibited taking to be 










[d. at 2415. 
16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (1994). 
16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(l), (b)(1). 
115 S. Ct. at 2412 n.9, 2414 n.13. 
[d. at 2412 n.9 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1804,26 (1978». As noted by 
the majority, 115 S. Ct. at 2412 n.9, the ESA also imposes civil penalties of up to 
$25,000 per violation upon a person who knowingly violates [section] 9's taking 
prohibition or the FWS's implementing regulations. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(a)(I) (1994). 
In addition, the ESA provides for a Civil penalty of up to $500 for any other viola-
tion of [section] 9 or the FWS's implementing regulations. [d. This latter 
provision does not explicitly include a mens rea element. The majority declined to 
Clecide whether a mens rea element should be imputed to this proVision, stating that 
"the proper case in which we might consider whether to do so in the [section] 9 
provision for a $500 civil penalty would be a challenge to enforcement of that 
provision itself, not a challenge to a regulation that merely defmes a statutory 
term." 115 S. Ct. at 2412 n.9. . 
16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(1) (1994). 
United States v. Billie, 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1493 (S.D. Fla. 1987); United States 
v. St. Onge, 676 F. Supp. 1044, 1045 (D. Mont. 1988). 
Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1492-94; St. Onge, 676 F. Supp. at 1044, 1045. See 
Davison, supra note 5, at 170-72. 
115 S. Ct. at 2424 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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"take" the way lower courts have defined "knowing" for purposes of the 
ESA's crimi rial provisions. He argued that a prohibited "take" is purposeful 
and subject to the lower civil penalties under the ESA when a "hunter shoots 
an elk in the mistaken belief that it is a mule deer."93 even if the hunter did 
not know that the elk is a protected species under the ESA.94 He argued, 
however, contrary to the approach followed by the lower courts (but without 
citing or discussing these lower court decisions), that a person would not 
"knowingly" violate the ESA's taking prohibitions unless the person knew 
"what sort of animal" he or she was taking. 95 
The Supreme Court's decision consequently will require lower courts to 
determine what mental state, if any, must be present in order for a prohibited 
taking in violation of section 9 to occur. If the majority's reference to a 
'''knowing' action" is interpreted as establishing a mental state element for 
a "take," courts will have to decide whether to detine "knowing" the way 
lower courts have defined "knowing" in criminal prosecutions under the 
ESA, or the way Justice Scalia defines the term in his dissent. 96 If the 
majority's reference to "knowing" violations of the Act is interpreted as 
referring to the provisions of section 11 rather than section 9 of the ESA, 
courts will have to decide how to interpret "knowing" in section 11 enforce-
ment actions-again having to choose between the lower court definition and 
Justice Scalia's definition. 
B. Omissions 
Although the FWS's detinition of harm explicitly refers only to acts, the 
definition may be interpreted to apply to omissions involving a breach of 
legal duty, as well as to aftirmative acts. Justice Scalia argued that the 
FWS's definition of harm violated the ESA because it prohibits omissions, 
as well as aftirmative acts, that actually kill or injure wildlife. 97 Neither the 
majority opinion nor Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion addressed this 
issue. 
93. [d. at 2425. 
94. [d. 
95. [d. 
96. In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor stated that she did not believe that it 
was necessary to decide if the ESA created a strict liability regime for prohibited 
takings. [d. at 2420 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She did sug~est, however, that 
she believed the FWS's definition of "hann" applied to • indirect (i.e., not 
purposeful)" conduct. [d. at 2419 n. *. 
97. 115 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Scalia acknowledged that the FWS interpreted its definition of 
harm under section 9 to prohibit omissions that actually kill or injure wild-
life. 98 He also stated that the federal government's brieffor petitioner argued 
that the FWS's definition of harm applied to omissions, but only when a 
person had a legal duty to act. 99 He argued, however, that the ESA's 
statutory detinition of "harm" requires "affirmative conduct intentionally 
directed against a particular animal or animals. "l()() In addition, there are 
other reasons to uphold the FWS's interpretation of its definition of harm as 
encompassing omissions. First, the ESA does not explicitly limit the ESA's 
taking prohibitions to affirmative acts. Next, there are reasonable arguments 
in support of extending the taking prohibitions to omissions that involve a 
breach of a legal duty that causes death or injury to wildlife species protected 
under the ESA. 101 The FWS's interpretation of its definition of harm as 
encompassing omissions may be upheld under the Chevron doctrine on the 
grounds that it is a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous provision of 
the ESA. 
c. Causation 
Although Justice Scalia argues that the FWS's detinition of harm under 
section 9 of the ESA prohibits habitat modification that is "the cause-in-fact 
of death or injury to wildlife . . . , regardless of whether that result is in-
tended or even foreseeable, and no matter how long the chain of causality 
between moditication and injury, "102 the majority held that the FWS's 
definition of harm is subject to "ordinary requirements .of proximate causa-
tion and foreseeability ... [and] 'but for' causation. "103 However, the 
majority did not explain how proximate causation and foreseeability should 
be detined. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor agreed that "the 
regulation'S application is limited by ordinary principles of proximate 
causation, which introduces notions of foreseeability. "1<14 She asserted that 
"[i]ndeed, by use of the word -~ actually,' the regulation clearly rejects 
98. [d. (citing 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748, 54,750 (1981». See Davison, supra note 5, at 
187-89. 
99. 115 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, I., dissenting). See Davison. supra note 5, at 188-89. 
100. 115 S. Ct. at 2424 (Scalia, 1 .. dissenting). 
101. See Davison, supra note 5. at 188-89. 
102. 115 S. Ct. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
103. [d. at2414n.13. 
104. [d. at 2418 (O'Connor, I., concurring). 
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speculative or conjectural effects, and thus itself invokes principles of 
proximate causation. "105 
1. Causation-in-Fact 
In order to prevail "in a civil tort case, a plaintiff is required to prove 
that the defendant's tortious conduct was both the cause-in-fact of the 
plaintiffs injury and the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury. "106 The 
traditional "but for" test for causation-in-fact was held to be required by the 
FWS's definition of harm. The "but for" test requires proof that the 
plaintiff's injury would not have occurred but for the defendant's conduct. 
However, many courts today apply the substantial factor test, a less rigorous 
test for causation-in-fact. Under the substantial factor test, a defendant's 
conduct is the cause-in-fact of the plaintiffs injury if the conduct was a 
substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs injury.l07 The majority makes no 
reference to the alternative substantial factor test, but states that the words 
other than "actually" in the FWS's definition of harm obviously require "but 
for" causation. lOS The ESA's purposes might have been better effectuated if 
the FWS's definition of harm had been interpreted as permitting causation-in-
fact to be satisfied either by the traditional "but for" test or by the modern. 
less demanding substantial factor test. However, because the FWS did not 
identify which test it intended to be used to establish causation-in-fact under 
its definition of "harm," the Court's selection of the traditional "but for" test 
is understandable. 
2. Proximate Causation and Foreseeability 
As noted earlier, the majority indicated that ordinary requirements of 
proximate causation and foreseeability are to be applied in interpreting the 
FWS's definition of harm. Justice O'Connor similarly argued that there was 
no indication that Congress "intended to dispense with ordinary princip les 
of proximate causation" in enacting section 11 109 of the ESA and that she: 
105. Id. at 2420 (emphasis added). 
106. See Davison, supra note 5, at 191 n.178 (citing Bert Black and David H. Hollander, 
Jr., Unravelling Causation: Back to the Basics, 3 U. BaIt. J. Envtl. L. 1. 1-2 
(1993». 
107. Id. (citing Black at 5-6.). 
108. 115 S. Ct. at 2414 n.13. 
109. 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (1994) (penalties and enforcement). 
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would not lightly assume that Congress . . . has dispensed with this 
well-entrenched principle. In the absence of congressional abrogation 
of traditional principles of causation, then, private parties should be 
held liable under [section] lS40[(a)](1) only if their habitat-modifying 
actions proximately cause death or injury to protected animals. 110 
Disagreeing with Justice Scalia's contentionll1 that the FWS's detinition of 
harm requires only causation-in-fact (but not proximate causation or 
foreseeability), Justice O'Connor asserted that "[t]he regulation, of course, 
does not contradict the presumption or notion that ordinary principles of 
causation apply here. indeed, by use of the word 'actuaqy,' the regulation 
clearly rejects speculative or conjectural effects. and thus itself invokes prin-
ciples of proximate causation. "112 
She then noted that "proximate causation is not a concept susceptible of 
precise detinition," but "normally eliminates the bizarre. "113 In addition, 
proximate causation alternatively has been characterized in functionally 
equivalent terms of foreseeability (natural and probable consequences) and 
duty, and that "proximate causation depends to a great extent on considera-
tions of the fairness of imposing liability for remote consequences. "114 She 
postulated, as a situation that would satisfy any formulation of proximate 
causation, a hypothetical where a "landowner who drains a pond on his 
property, killing endangered tish in the process. "115 On the other hand. 
"[t]he farmer whose fertilizer is lifted by tornado from tilled fields and 
deposited miles away in a wildlife refuge cannot, by any stretch of the term, 
be considered the proximate cause of death or injury to protected species 
occasioned thereby. "116 She aiso implied that Justice Scalia's hypothetical 
"farmer who tills his field and causes erosion that makes silt run into a 
nearby river which depletes oxygen and thereby [injures] protected tish, "117 
would not be the proximate cause of the injury to the fish under the foresee-
ability element of the FWS's detinition of harm. Prior to referencing this 
hypothetical. she stated that the foreseeability element in the detinition 
110. 115 S. Ct. at 2420 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
111. ld. at 2421 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
112. ld. at 2420 (emphasis added) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
113. ld. (citation omitted). 




158 Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 5 
"would appear to alleviate some of the problems noted by the dissent. "118 
In light of widespread knowledge of the harm caused by pollution from non-
point source runoff, many people might argue that the injury to the !ish in 
the hypothetical was a foreseeable result of the farmer tilling his field (at 
least if the farmer failed to use accepted soil conservation and best manage-
ment practices to minimize erosion). 
Although the FWS' s use of the word "actually" in its definition of harm 
may indicate that the FWS intended only to require causation-in-fact, the 
majority's decision implies a proximate causation-foreseeability element and 
thus interjects considerations of fairness (through foreseeability requirements) 
into the application of the FWS's harm regulation. This implied element of 
proximate causation may help to reduce political opposition in Congress to 
the ESA and its taking prohibitions. Reduced political opposition to the ESA 
may save the ESA from amendments that weaken or repeal the Act's taking 
prohibitions. Until such legislative amendments of the ESA are adopted, 
"[t]he task of determining whether proximate causation exists in the limitless 
fact patterns sure to arise is best left to lower courts. "119 
D. Definition of Injure 
The majority did not explicitly discuss how the phrase "injures wildlife" 
in the FWS's definition of harm should be interpreted. Justice O'Connor's 
concurring opinion and Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, however, address 
the issue at length, but take contradictory positions on several issues in-
volving the interpretation of the term "injures." 
The FWS does not define "injures" in its definition of harm. Conse-
quently, a number of questions have arisen as to how the term "injures" 
should be defined. These questions include whether it means only physical 
injury to particular, individual animals (and, if so, whether physical injury 
must be serious or permanent, or both), or whether it can also can be defined 
to. encompass non-physical injuries (for example, impairment of essential 
behavioral patterns, such as breeding, feeding, or sheltering). Although 
Justices Scalia and O'Connor discussed whether "injures" includes only 
injury to particular, individual animals, or also includes injury to a 
population of a protected species, the majority did not address this issue. 
118. ld. 
119. 115 S. Ct. at 2420 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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mJury. These results were reached despite the fact that the FWS's com-
mentary accompanying their 1981 redetinition of harm indicates that the 
requirement of actual death or injury necessitates "proven injury"121 (a.k.a. 
actual adverse effectsl22) and excludes actions which potentially threaten 
injury to members of a protected species. 123 This commentary might be 
interpreted as expressing an intent to make the definition of "harm" 
inapplicable to actions that only threaten to cause death or injury to animals 
in the future. The commentary's requirement for "proven injury" and the 
commentary's exclusion of actions that potentially cause injury were noted 
by Justice O'Connor. 124 Likewise, the commentary's exclusion of actions that 
potentially cause injury was cited by Justice Scalia. 125 None of the Justices 
explicitly addressed whether the FWS's exclusion of actions potentially 
causing injury means that section 9 does not prohibit actions that threaten 
only to cause future death or injury to members of a protected species. 
In Forest Conservation Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 126 however, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the FWS's 
definition of "harm" should be interpreted (at least in a citizen suit under the 
ESA seeking an injunction) to apply to an action that presents an imminent 
threat of future injury to protected wildlife. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit 
ruled that habitat modification that is reasonably certain in the future to 
injure a pair of threatened northern spotted owls is actual injury within the 
meaning of the FWS's definition of harm and a prohibited "take" in violation 
of section 9 of the ESA.127 Although Rosboro Lumber Co. was decided 
before the Supreme Court's Sweet Home Chapter decision, the Ninth Circuit 
later held, in Murrelet v. Babbit,128 that the Supreme Court's Sweet Home 
Chapter decision did not nUllify Rosboro Lumber Co. 's holding that a 
121. 46 Fed. Reg. 54,749 (1981). 
122. Id. at 54,750. 
123. Id. at 54,749. 
124. 115 S. Ct. at 2419 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he Service says that the regula-
tion has no application to speculative hann, explaining that its insertion of the word 
'actually' was intended 'to bulwark the need tor proven injury to a species due to 
a party's actions'." 46 Fed. Reg. at 54,749; see also id. (approving language that 
"Hann covers actions ... which actually (as opposed to potentially), cause 
injury. "). 
125. 115 S. Ct. at 2430 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He states that "by the use of the word 
'actually,' the regulation clearly rejects speculative or conjectural effects, and . . 
• [t]he injury must be 'actual' as opposed to 'potential' .... '[A]ctually' defines 
the requisite injury, not the requisite causality." Id. (emphasis added). 
126. 50 F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 1995). 
127. Id. 
128. 1996 WL 227326 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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definition of "harm" should be interpreted (at least in a citizen suit under the 
ESA seeking an injunction) to apply to an action that presents an imminent 
threat of future injury to protected wildlife. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit 
ruled that habitat modification that is reasonably certain in the future to 
injure a pair of threatened northern spotted owls is actual injury within the 
meaning of the FWS' s definition of harm and a prohibited "take" in violation 
of section 9 of the ESA.127 Although Rosboro Lumber Co. was decided 
before the Supreme Court's Sweet Home Chapter decision, the Ninth Circuit 
later held, in Murrelet v. Babbit,128 that the Supreme Court's Sweet Home 
Chapter decision did not nUllify Rosboro Lumber Co. 's holding that a 
showing of a future injury to an endangered or threatened species is 
actionable under the ACt. 129 The court reached this conclusion without 
discussing the fact that Sweet Home Chapter neither discusses the RO~'boro 
Lumber Co. decision nor the issue of whether "harm" can be interpreted to 
include an action that only threatens to cause death or injury in the future to 
members of a protected species. 
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit in Murrelet concluded that the Supreme 
Court's emphasis in the Sweet Home Chapter decision on the need for actual 
death or injury of a protected animal did not "limit injunctive relief under the 
ESA to past violations. "130 They reasoned that the Supreme Court found that 
the Act's taking prohibition, which establishes "a duty to avoid harm that 
habitat alteration will cause, "131 is reasonable. The court therefore concluded 
that the Sweet Home Chapter decision supports its position that" a reasonably 
certain threat of imminent harm to a protected species is sufficient for 
issuance of an injunction under section 9 of the ESA. "132 
In Rosboro Lumber Co., the Ninth Circuit interpreted the term "actually" 
in the FWS's definition of harm to exclude actions that only caused habitat 
modification without causing death or injury of protected wildlife, but "not 
... to foreclose claims of an imminent threat of injury to wildlife. "133 In 
addition, the court held that the FWS's exclusion of actions threatening a po-
tential injury excludes only actions that involve a possibility of causing an 
127. [d. 
128. 1996 WL 227326 (9th Cir. 1996). 
129. [d. 
130. [d. at *5. 
131. 115 S. Ct. at 2412. 
132. 1996 WL 227326, at *5. 
133. 50 F.3d at 784. 
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"injury that mayor may not occur," not actions that create "an imminent 
threat of death or injury. "134 The Ninth Circuit thus concluded that the 
FWS's use of the terms "actually" and "potentially" was meant only "to 
specify the degree of certainty that harm would befall a protected species as 
opposed to the timing of the injury. "135 
The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that any ambiguity as to whether 
Congress intended "harm" to be interpreted in this manner "is resolved by 
looking to the underlying purpose of the ESA," which is "to conserve 
endangered species." Therefore, "Congress' overriding purpose in enacting 
the ESA indicates that it intended to allow citizen suits to enjoin an imininent 
threat of harm to protected wildlife. "136 The court reached its holding 
because of a concern that the contrary would weaken the ESA by allowing 
members of a protected species to be injured (taken) despite such injury 
being imminent and reasonably certain to occur. The court noted that such 
injury "can seldom be adequately remedied by money damages and is often 
permanent or at least of long duration, i. e., irreparable. "137 If an action that 
imminently threatens to kill or injure members of a protected species cannot 
be enjoined as a violation of section 9, then the only remedy under the ESA 
would be to impose civil or criminal penalties for a violation of section 9 
after protected wildlife is killed or injured. Although the threat of civil or 
criminal penalties may deter a person from undertaking an action that 
threatens to kill or injure wildlife in the future, issuing an injunction to pre-
vent that action from occurring better serves the ESA's purpose of conserv-
ing endangered and threatened species of wildlife. 
The citizen suit provision138 and the United States Attorney General's 
enforcement provision139 of the ESA only authorize suits "to enjoin any 
person who is alleged to be in violation" of the Act or regulations issued 
under the Act. Still, the Ninth Circuit in Rosboro Lumber Co. relied on the 
ESA's legislative history to infer that Congress intended to authorize citizens 
and the Attorney General to obtain an injunction in suits brought under these 
provisions against an action that creates an imminent threat of future death 
134. [d. at 784-85 (citation omitted)(emphasis added). 
135. [d. at 785. 787. 
136. [d. at 787. 
137. [d. (quoting Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987». 
138. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1994)., 
139. [d. § 1540(e)(6). 
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or injury to members of a protected species even if the action has caused no 
past or present injury to members of a protected species. 140 
Because the Supreme Court's Sweet Home Chapter decision did not 
address the issue of whether the FWS's definition of harm can apply to 
actions that only threaten to cause future death or injury to members of a 
protected species, courts in future cases will have to decide whether the 
Rosboro Lumber Co. decision is a correct interpretation of harm. 141 If 
another jurisdiction rejects the Ninth Circuit's Rosboro Lumber Co. decision 
and holds that an action only threatening to cause future death or injury to 
members of a protected species cannot be enjoined under section 9 of the 
ESA, the only remedy available will be the imposition of civil and criminal 
penalties after the action causing death or injury has taken place. 
The FWS's definition of harm not only fails to indicate whether it 
includes the threat of future death or injury, but also fails to define the term 
"injures." However, as Justice O'Connor emphasized in Sweet Home 
140. 
141. 
50 F.3d at 785-86 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 412, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1973) 
and S. Rep. No. 418, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1982». The Ninth Circuit, 
however, left open the issue of whether an action that met its definition of harm 
would be subject to civil or criminal monetary penalties under 16 U.S. C. § 1540(a) 
or (b) for a "knowing violation" of the Act or regulations issued under the Act. 50 
F.3d at 786 n.3. 
The Ninth Circuit also found that prior court decisions "support its conclusion 
that Congress intended to authorize plaintiffs to enjoin an imminent threat of injury 
to protected species." [d. at 786. The court inteq~reted its decision in Palila v. 
Hawaii Department of Land & Natural Resources (Palila II), 852 F.2d 1106 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (see Davison, supra note 5, at 198-205), as upholding issuance of an 
injunction under the ESA against prospective harm to members of a protected 
species. 50 F.3d at 786. The Ninth Circuit read American Bald Eagle v. Bhatti, 
9 F.3d 163 (1st Cir. 1993), as interpreting the terms "actually" and "potentially" 
in the FWS's redefinition of harm as specifying "the de[Jree oJ certainty that injury 
would befall a protected species, as opposed to the timing of the injury," 50 F. 3d 
at 787 (emphasis added); and quoted the statement in Bhatti, 9 F.3d at 166, that 
"[c]ourts have granted injunctive relief only [if] the alleged activity has actually 
hanned the species or ... will actually, as opposed to I?otentially, cause harm to 
the species." Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court s decision in Gwaltney of 
Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesar.eake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987) (dealing 
with the Clean Water Act s citizen suit provision, 33 U.S.C. § 505) was interpreted 
in Rosboro Lumber Co. as not having addressed the issue of "whether citizen suits 
can be maintained for claims of only future violations, and in no way implied that 
such claims are not actionable." 50 F.3d at 787. The Ninth Circuit in Rosboro 
Lumber Co. also supported its holding by citing, at id. at 787, Tennessee Valley 
Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), but failed to note that the Supreme Court's 
decision in that case was based upon section 7 of the Act, not sectIOn 9's taking 
prohibition. 
See, e.g., Loggerhead Turtle v. Volusia County Council, 896 F. Supp. 1170,1180 
(M.D. Fla. 1995) discussed the decision in Rosboro Lumber and held that "the 
future threat of a [sic] even [a] single taking is sufticient to invoke the authority of 
the Act." The court in Loggerhead Turlle consequently held that a preliminary 
injunction could be issued under the ESA against a person whose 'conduct is 
reasonably likely to result in any 'taking' of [a] protected species." [d. 
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Chapter,142 this statement might be interpreted either as implying: 1) that the 
FWS's definition of harm includes indirect physical injury as well as direct 
physical injury to an individual animal; or 2) that the FWS's definition of 
harm includes injury to a population of a protected species, as well as injury 
to individual animals. 143 Yet another possible interpretation is that the 
statement means that "injure" can encompass harm or adverse effects other 
than direct physical injury. The FWS's commentary states that its amended 
definition of harm eliminates the misperception "that significant habitat 
destruction which could be shown to injure protected wildlife through the 
impairment of its essential behavioral patterns was not subject to the Act, " 
and that "[ d]eath or injury . . . may be caused by impairment of essential 
behavioral patterns which can have significant and permanent effects on a 
listed species. "144 These statements can also be interpreted as indicating that 
the FWS intended "injure" to include impairment of essential behavioral 
patterns, such as breeding, feeding, or sheltering, as well as physical 
injury.145 Alternatively, these statements might be interpreted as not defining 
"injure," but as only indicating that injury can be caused by impairing 
essential behavioral patterns. In addition, the FWS's reference to "signifi-
cant and permanent effects" might be interpreted either as indicating that 
injury can occur only when signiticant and permanent effects are caused, or 
alternatively, as only indicating that causing signiticant and permanent effects 
are sufficient (but not necessary) to injure a protected species. Courts in 
future cases will have to decide which of these is the proper interpretation 
of "take" under section 9 and "harm" and "injure" under the FWS's 
detinition of harm. 
In Sweet Home Chapter, Justice Scalia takes the position that a prohibited 





115 S. Ct. at 2419-20 (O'Connor, J .. concurring). 
The FWS's commentary accompanying its 1981 amendments to its detinition of 
harm makes a reference to "injury to a population," 46 Fed. Reg. at 54,749 (which 
the FWS stated involves a "question ... of fact"), but the FWS did not state 
explicitly whether its detinition of harm encompasses injury to a population and, if 
so. what types of effects would constitute injury to a population. 
46 Fed. Reg. 54.748 (1981). 
Without supporting analysis, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted this 
inte:pretation in Rosboro Lumber Co .. 50 F.3d at 788, stating that "lh]abitat 
modltications that signiticantly impair a protected species' essential behavioral 
patterns are ex,Plicitly proscribed by the Secretary's redetinition of 'harm. '" In a 
subsequent opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that "under Sweet Home, a habitat 
moditication which signiticantly impairs the breeding and sheltering of a protected 
species amounts to 'harm' under that ESA ... [and that] 'harm' under the ESA, 
tlierefore, includes that threat of future harm." Murrelet v. Babbitt, 1996 WL 
227326, at *6-*7 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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or physical injury to a particular individual animal or animals. 146 Although 
he does not explicitly state that injure under the FWS' s definition of harm 
shQuld be limited to physical injury, he implies such a position. For 
example, in criticizing Justice O'Connor's interpretation of "harm" and 
"injure, " he refers to her "imaginative construction" as achieving "the result 
of extending 'impairment of breeding' to individual animals. but only at the 
expense of also expanding 'injury' to include elements beyond physical harm 
to individual animals. "147 In addition, Justice Scalia referred to the "more 
common and preferred usage" of harm, defining it as "to impair soundness 
of body, either animal or vegetable" and "'to do ... bodily harm. "148 
Justice Scalia also argued that "[i]mpairment of breeding does not 'injure' 
living creatures, "149 to show that the FWS's definition of harm violates the 
ESA by encompassing injury to populations of protected species as well as 
injury to individual animals. 
However, Justice O'Connor notes that death of one animal reduces the 
population so that the death of one member of a wildlife population "in that 
sense, 'injures' that population. "150 Similarly, one could argue that injury 
of even one animal harms the population so that injury of one member of a 
wildlife population" injures" that population. Consequently, as suggested by 
Justice O'Connor, the focus on interpretation of "injures" in the FWS's defi-
nition of harm should be upon what types of adverse effects upon individual 
animals should be considered an injury and what types of evidence or facts 
should be considered sufficient to demonstrate injury to protected members 
of a species. In fact, as Justice O'Connor notes,151 the FWS's commentary 
accompanying its 1981 amendments to its definition of harm states that 
"section 9's threshold focuses on individual members of a protected 
species. "152 
After Justice Scalia stated that the FWS's definition of harm violated the 
ESA because it encompasses injury to populations of species and that the 
"impairment of breeding does not 'injure' living creatures," he added that 
impairment of breeding "prevents them from propagating, thus 'injuring' a 
146. 115 S. Ct. at 2430 (Scalia, J .. dissenting). 
147. 115 S. Ct. at 2430 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(emphasis added). 
148. [d. at 2423 (emphasis added). 
149. [d. at 2422. 
150. [d. at 2418 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
151. 115 S. Ct. at 2419. 
152. [d. (citing 46 Fed. Reg. at 54.749 (1981». 
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population of animals which would otherwise have maintained or increased 
its numbers. "153 
Justice O'Connor disagreed with this approach, stating that the FWS's 
detinition of harm focuses on actual harm (not speculative or potential harm) 
to individual members of a protected species. 154 She concluded that both the 
FWS's detinition of harm, and the 1981 commentary accompanying the 
FWS's promulgation of the amended detinition, recognized harm as occur-
ring to individual members of a protected species when their breeding is 
impaired. 
As an initial matter, I do not tind it as easy as Justice Scalia does 
to dismiss the notion that significant impairment of breeding injures 
living creatures. To raze the last remaining ground on which the 
piping plover currently breeds, thereby making it impossible for any 
piping plovers to reproduce, would obviously injure the popUlation 
(causing the species' extinction in a generation). But by completely 
preventing breeding, it would also injure the individual living bird, 
in the same way that sterilizing the creature injures the individual 
living bird. To "injure" is, among other things, "to impair" .... 
One need not subscribe to theories of "psychic harm" . . . to 
recognize that to make it impossible for an animal to reproduce is to 
impair its most essential physical functions and to render that animal, 
and its genetic material, biologically obsolete. This, in my view, is 
actual injury. 
In any event, even if impairing an animal's ability to breed were 
not, in and of itself, an injury to that animal, interference with 
153. 115 S. Ct. at 2422 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). Near the end of his 
dissenting opinion, however, Justice Scalia stated: 
As I understand the regulation that the Court has created and held 
consistent with the statute that it has also created, habitat modification can 
constitute a "taking", but only if it results in the killing or harming of 
individual animals, and only if that consequence is the direct result of the 
modification. This means that the destruction of privately owned habitat 
that is essential, not for the feeding or nesting, but for the breeding, of 
butterflies, would not violate the Act, since it would not harm or kilI any 
living butterfly. I, too, think it would not violate the Act-not for the 
utterly unsupported reason that habitat modifications fall outside the regu-
lation if they happen not to kill or injure a living animal, but for the textual 
reason that only action directed at living animals constitutes a "take." 
[d. at 2431 (emphasis added). 
154. [d. at 2419. 
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breeding can cause an animal to suffer other, perhaps more obvious, 
kinds of injury. The regulation has clear application, for example, to 
significant habitat modification that kills or physically injures animals 
which, because they are in a vulnerable breeding state, do not or 
cannot flee or defend themselves, or to environmental pollutants that 
cause an animal to suffer physical complications during gestation. 
Breeding, feeding, and sheltering are what animals do. If significant 
habitat modification, by interfering with these essential behaviours, 
actually kills or injures an animal protected by the Act, it causes 
"harm" within the meaning of the regulation. In contrast to Justice 
Scalia, I do not read. the regulation's "breeding" reference to vitiate 
or somehow to qualify the clear actual death or injury requirement, 
or to suggest that the regulation contemplates extension to nonexistent 
animals. 155 
Justice Scalia responded to Justice O'Connor's argument by referring to 
it as an "imaginative construction [that] does achieve the result of extending 
'impairment of breeding' to individual animals. "156 He argued, however, 
that her construction does so: 
only at the expense of also expanding "injury" to include elements 
beyond physical harm to individual animals. For surely the only 
harm to the individual animal from impairment of that "essential 
function" is not the failure of issue (which harms only the issue), but 
the psychic harm of perceiving that it will leave this world with no 
issue (assuming, of course, that the animal in question, perhaps an 
endangered species of slug, is capable of such painful sentiments). 
If it includes that psychic harm, then why not the psychic harm of not 
being able to frolic about - so that the draining of a pond used for 
an endangered animal's recreation, but in no way essential to its 
survival, would be prohibited by the Act? That the concurrence is 
driven to such a dubious redoubt is an argument for, not against, the 
proposition that "injury" in the regulation includes injury to popula-
tions of animals. Even more so with the concurrence's alternative 
explanation: that "impairment of breeding" refers to nothing more 
than concrete injuries inflicted by the habitat modification on the ani-
155 [d. 
156. 115 S. Ct. at 2430 n.5 (Scalia. J., dissenting). 
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mal who does the breeding, such as "physical complications [suf-
fered] during gestation" . . .. Quite obviously, if "impairment of 
breeding" meant such physical harm to an individual animal, it would 
not have had to be mentioned. IS7 
Justice Scalia interprets the ESA's definition of harm as encompassing 
only death or physical injury to particular individual animals. Justice 
O'Connor, however, interprets the FWS's definition of harm as lawfully 
including impairment of breeding, feeding, or sheltering of members of a 
protected species which, she believes, can constitute injury to the individual 
member of that species as well as injury to the population in which the 
members reside. 
Justice O'Connor stated that she would not tind harm and a prohibited 
"take" simply because "a protected animal could have eaten the leaves of a 
fallen tree or could, perhaps, have fruitfully multiplied in its branches ... 
. Instead, ... the regulation requires demonstrable effect (i. e., actual injury 
or death) on actual, individual members of the protected species. "158 She 
also asserted that under her interpretation, the court of appeals wrongly 
decided Palila II,159 which she described as holding "that a state agency com-
mitted a 'taking' by permitting feral sheep to eat mamane-naio seedlings that, 
when fully grown, might have fed and sheltered endangered palila. "160 She 
argued that in PaliLa II, the "[ d]estruction of the seedlings did not proxi-
mately cause actual death or injury to identifiable birds; it merely prevented 
the regeneration of forest land not currently inhabited by actual birds. "161 
However, the court of appeals actually affirmed the district court's 
decisionl62 that there was "harm" under the FWS's detinition on the grounds 
that the habitat destruction being caused by the mouflon sheep "could result 
157. [d. (emphasis added). 
158. [d. at 2419 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
159. 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). 
160. 115 S. Cl. at 2420-21 (O'Connor, J., concurring). These facts to which she refers, 
however, appear to be the facts in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and NaLUral 
Resources (Palila I), 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), aff'd 639 F.2d 495 (9th 
Cir. 1981). See Davison, supra note 5, at 181-83,198-205. Palila 1 involved feral 
sheep, while Palila II involved mouflon sheep. Palila 1 interpreted the FWS's 1975 
definition of harm, which was amended in 1981 by the FWS to its present form, to 
make clear that habitat modification must actually kill or injure protected wildlife 
in order to constitute "harm." See Davison, supra note 5, at 183-85. 
161. 115 S. Ct. at 2421 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
162. 649 F. Supp. 1070 (D. Haw. 1986), aff'd, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988). 
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in the extinction" of the palila species 163 and did "not reach the issue of 
whether the district court properly found that harm included habitat 
degradation that prevents recovery of an endangered species." 164 The 
holding in Palila II and the alternative holding of the district court that the 
court of appeals did not reach might be characterized as tinding harm under 
the FWS's definition because of injury to a population of the palila species 
as opposed to injury to particular, individual palila birds. 
While Justices O'Connor and Scalia in Sweet Home Chapter reject injury 
to a population as "harm" (when the injury to the population is not the 
collective injury to identifiable, individual protected animals), the majority 
did not explicitly address the issue of whether the FWS's detinition of harm 
encompasses injury to a population. The majority, however, stated that 
"[t]he dissent incorrectly asserts that the Secretary's regulation ... 'fail[s] 
to require injury to particular animals.' "165 Furthermore, the majority refers 
to harm occurring within the meaning of the FWS's definition when there is 
actual killing or injury of members of an endangered or threatened species. 166 
Justice Scalia asserts that this was a concession "that the statute require[d] 
injury to particular animals rather than merely to populations of animals. "167 
A strong case can be made that the majority in Sweet Home Chapter 
rejected the concept of "injury to population" as detined in Palila II,I6l$ 
although the issue of what constitutes "injury" is still subject to interpretation 
by the lower courts. The majority's and concurrence's references to the 
ordinary requirements of proximate causation and foreseeability and to harm 
occurring when there is actual killing or injury to members may lead to the 
conclusion that mere generalized claims of a population's decline, without 
production of evidence of actual injury or death to identifiable animals, will 
not satisfy the harm requirement. Thus, it appears that the majority modities 
Sierra Club v. Lyng, 169 by requiring a greater focus on foreseeable injury to 
individual animals as a condition for establishing injury to populations. Lyng 








852 F.2d at 1110. 
[d. at 1110-11. See Davison, supra note 5, at 198-205. 
115 S. Ct. at 2414 n.13 (quoting Scalia, J., [d. at 2429). 
115 S. Ct. at 2412-13,2414 n.13. 
[d. at 2430 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
However, in Seattle Audubon Society v. Moseley, 42 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1568, 1570 
(9th Cir. 1996), the court concluded that, in Sweet Home Chapter, five justices 
affirmed the Palila II decision "in all respects. " 
694 F. Supp. 1260 (E.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. 
Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 926 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1991). 
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modification of the species' habitat causes the population of the species 
within that habitat to decline as a result of the members' death.!70 Lyng's 
focus upon the decline in the overall population of the species within the 
moditied habitat might result in the court's holding being characterized as 
being based upon an injury to a population. However, the court's reference 
to the population decline being due to members of the species dying!7! might 
result in Lyng being viewed as a decision defining "harm" on the basis of 
actual death or injury to individual members of the species. 
Suffice it to say that after Sweet Home Chapter, lower courts will have 
to decide if the FWS' s definition of harm encompasses an injury to a popula-
tion, and, if so, what types of effects upon a population will be considered 
injury to that population. 
V. INTERPRETATION OF STATE PROHIBITIONS AGAINST 
TAKING PROTECTED SPECIES 
Section 6(t) of the ESA prohibits "any state law or regulation respecting 
the taking of an endangered or threatened species ... [from being] less 
restrictive than the prohibitions" in any regulation which implements the 
ESA.!72 Any less restrictive state taking law or regulation is therefore 
preempted by section 6(t).173 However, section 6(t) does not require a state 
to adopt a statute or regulation that prohibits the taking of an endangered or 
threatened species; it only requires a state taking statute or regulation to be 
at least as restrictive as the FWS's definition of harm under section 9 of the 
ESA.174 A state, however, only needs to follow the FWS's detinition of 
harm and the Supreme Court's interpretation of this definition. A state 
would not be required to follow interpretations of the FWS' s definition by 
federal courts of appeals, federal district courts. or courts of other states.!75 
Furthermore, a state would not be required to follow the FWS's definition 
of "harm" or "harass," or section 9 of the ESA's definition of "take," when 
170. See Davison, supra note 5, at 192-97. 
171. 694 F. Supp. at 1271. 
172. 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f) (1994). 
173. See United States v. Glenn-Colusa Irrigation Dist., 788 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (E.D. 
Cal. 1992); Swan View Coalition, Inc. v. Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923, 938 (D. Mont. 
1992). 
174. Swan View Coalition, 824 F. Supp. at 938. 
175. See United States ex reI. Lawrence v. Woods, 432 F.2d 1072,1075 (7th Cir. 1970) 
("because lower federal courts exercise no appellate jurisdiction over state tribunals, 
decisions of lower federal courts are not conclusive on state courts .... "). 
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applying a state takings statute or regulation to species that are protected 
under a state endangered species statute or regulation, but are not listed as 
an endangered or threatened species under the federal ESA. 176 
The application of Sweet Home Chapter in Maryland may be particularly 
difficult because the State has not enacted any provision allowing for the 
incidental taking of threatened or endangered species. Thus, unlike section 
10 of the federal ESA, which accommodates impacts on species' habitat 
under the incidental take criteria, the Maryland ESA has no mechanism for 
avoiding situations where a project may affect a particular listed species or 
its habitat. This problem came to the fore in the case of Indian Bridge Road 
in St. Mary's County, which could not be widened because the construction 
would affect the habitat of the eastern narrow mouth toad, a State listed en-
dangered species. 177 Without an incidental take provision, Maryland law 
requires the State to deny any project that would result in the taking of even 
one member of the listed species.178 After denial of the road-widening 
project, some people attributed a tragic accident that killed a young student 
to the inability of the State to widen the road because of the presence of the 
toad. 179 A State Task Force recently issued a report recommending that 
Maryland's law be amended to allow for incidental take authority to avoid 
such conflicts in the future. lso Unfortunately, the Task Force members and 
the Maryland Department of Natural Resources could not reach agreement 
to allow the introduction of legislation during the 1995 session of the 
Maryland General Assembly to address this inadequacy. It remains to be 
seen whether this issue will be addressed in future sessions of the Maryland 






Maryland has a state program for protecting endangered and threatened species of 
wildlife and plants. MD. CODE ANN., NAT. RES., §§ 1O-2A-01 (1990 and Supp. 
1995). Regulations under the Act generally prohibit the taking of any endangered 
or threatened wildlife species under the Act. COMAR 08.03.08.04, 
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dilemma. Should a state court broadly interpret it to apply to species 
protected under state law and to encompass habitat modification that may 
cause some foreseeable harm to a listed species, conflicts like those seen in 
the Indian Bridge Road case may be repeated. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In upholding the FWS's definition of harm in Sweet Home Chapter, the 
Supreme Court viewed the case as a facial challenge to the FWS's harm 
regulations. The Court found that it could only rule in the timber industry's 
favor if it found that a "take" could never arise from habitat modification. 
However, Justice Stevens recognized that there are strong arguments that 
certain land use activities causing "minimal or unforeseeable harm" do not 
rise to the level of a statutory "take. "181 The result is that the FWS's 
enforcement of harm must be scrutinized on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, 
in a specific factual situation, the effect of a builder's proposed land use on 
endangered or threatened species' habitat may be fully within the law and not 
trigger "take" liability unless the activity causes some. unforeseeable and 
remote harm to an ESA listed species. 
However, the FWS's definition of harm, as interpreted by the court, will 
have the effect of prohibiting modification of wildlife habitat on both private 
and public lands, when such modification actually and foreseeably causes 
death or injury to members of an endangered or threatened species protected 
under the ESA. The precise impact of the FWS's definition of harm upon 
the development of private land will depend upon how any mental state 
element is defined, upon whether omissions are encompassed within the 
definition, and how the term "injure" is defined under the definition. At 
present, the application of the definition to threats of future injury, to harm 
other than physical injuries, and to injuries to a population of a, species, is 
unclear. 
A landowner whose development of private land is sought to be prevented 
under the FWS's definition of harm may obtain relief by establishing: 1) 
that any injuries or harm to protected species as a result of habitat modi-
fication would be minor or insubstantial, or would be unforeseeable (not 
natural and probable) consequences of the land development activities; or 2) 
that the ESA's prohibition of their private land development is a taking of 
181. 115 S. Ct. at 2414. 
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private property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution. 
The battle over protection of the habitats of endangered and threatened 
species under the ESA has shifted to Congress. Congress is considering 
several bills that would narrow the FWS' s detinition of harm. Opponents of 
the ESA have proposed amendments to the Act that would overrule the 
Supreme Court's recent Sweet Home Chapter decision and make the ESA 
inapplicable to modifications of wildlife habitat on private lands. The 
majority and dissenting opinions will provide ammunition for each respective 
side in the ongoing debate over whether and to what degree private land 
development activities should be allowed to affect endangered and threatened 
species and their habitats. 
